The Latest on the California DUI Laws & Amendments: The Ignition Interlock Device & Restricted License Laws

The authors of “California Drunk Driving Law” share this excellent summary of: (1) California’s new Ignition Interlock Device (IID) Restricted License amendments; and (2) the mandatory Ignition Interlock Device IID program.

The New IID Restricted License Laws—SB-598 and SB-895 (Effective: July 1, 2010)

CVC § 13352(a)(3)—IID restricted license available to second-time offenders convicted of CVC §§ 23152(a) or (b) after 90 days, unless the defendant was found by the Court to be under the influence of a drug or the combined influence of drugs and alcohol. For those who qualify, credits should be given for APS suspension time.

CVC § 13352.5—Work-related restricted license, which continues to be available to second-time offenders after 12 months of suspension, without the need for an Ignition Interlock Device; but the IID restricted license referred to above would still be available to the same offender after just 90 days of suspension.

CVC § 13352(a)(5)—IID restricted license available to third-time offenders convicted of CVC §§ 23152(a) or (b) after 180 days, unless the defendant was found by the Court to be under the influence of a drug or the combined influence of drugs and alcohol. For those who qualify, credits should be given for APS suspension time.

CVC § 13353.3(2)(B)—APS suspension for multiple offenders administratively suspended for excessive blood alcohol levels, who are also convicted of a CVC § 23152 offense arising out of the same incident, may have the APS suspension terminated if IID restricted license obtained pursuant to 13352(a)(3) or (5).

Questions That Remain Unanswered By These New Statutory Amendments:

1. Will the law be applied retroactively to persons convicted before July 1, 2010?

The latest information we have is that it is going to be applied prosectively only.*

2. Will persons suffering an excessive BAC one-year suspension, but who are not also convicted of a CVC § 23152 offense arising out of the same incident, be allowed to terminate the APS suspension with installation of an IID?

The written law does not provide for it; but a denial of it lacks a rational basis and leads to an absurd result.

3. Will the DMV continue to impose a license suspension/revocation for second and third time offenders convicted of drug-related CVC § 23152 convictions, even though CVC § 13352(a)(3) and (5) have been amended to only trigger a suspension or revocation for alcohol-only CVC § 23152 offenses?

Independent Mandatory IID Pilot Program For Persons Convicted In Alameda, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Tulare Counties (effective July 1, 2010):

CVC § 23700 requires the DMV to maintain a pilot program from July 1, 2010 through January 1, 2016 in Alameda, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Tulare counties, requiring ignition interlock devices for all vehicles owned or operated by DUI offenders. The duration period for the device is as follows:

CVC § 23152 conviction CVC § 23153 conviction

First Offense: 5 months & 12 months

Second Offense: 12 months & 24 months

Third Offense: 24 months & 36 months

Fourth Offense or More: 36 months & 48 months

These IID Orders are to be issued and monitored by the DMV upon receipt of the abstract of conviction, and verification is required before a driver’s license may be issued, reissued, or returned to the licensee after a suspension or revocation of that person’s driving privilege. 

CVC § 23700(a)(3)—Actual operation of this new statute is subject to funding approval which has apparently been provided by the federal Office of Transportation.

There are a number of exemptions that defendants may seek with the DMV within 30 days of receiving its IID Order. See CVC § 23700(a)(8) for the complete list. 

IID devices are not required for motorcycles, but those subject to the IID requirement may not operate their motorcycle during the IID restriction period. See CVC § 23700(e).

These IID requirements should only apply to convictions with violation dates July 1, 2010, or later, but it remains to be seen if the DMV will attempt to apply it to all convictions in these counties suffered July 1, 2010, or later, regardless of the violation date.*

California Drunk Driving Law (Kuwatch, Burglin & Simons)

The DUI Exception to the Constitution is Real!

Criminal defense attorneys have for years joked that it seemed that there was a DUI exception to the Constitution when laws and procedures that would be clearly unconstitutional in other contexts are upheld by courts when applied to driving under the influence.  Now, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has recognized that such an exception does indeed exist.

Justice Roberts, in a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, wrote to protest that the U.S. Supreme Court had denied review of a case where the Virginia Supreme Court had overturned a DUI conviction because the police had pulled over a driver based on an anonymous tip. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. ____ (2009).   The Virginia Supreme Court felt that the U.S. Constitution and previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions prevented the police from acting on uncorroborated anonymous information.  Most states, including California, have ruled that the police may stop drivers suspected of driving under the influence based solely on anonymous information, and even without any specific evidence of impaired driving, but merely that the driver is “drunk.”  See People v. Wells, 38 Cal.4th 1078 (2006).  Other states, including now Virginia, have ruled that the police must have some corroboration of anonymous information before detaining a person.  Roberts seemed to disagree, writing “I am not sure that the Fourth Amendment requires independent corroboration before the police can act, at least in the special context of anonymous tips reporting drunk driving.”  [Emphasis added].  Roberts was especially concerned about the 13,000 allegedly DUI related deaths each year.  He went on to note that “this court has in fact recognized that the dangers posed by drunk drivers are unique, frequently upholding anti-drunk-driving policies that might be constitutionally problematic in other, less exigent circumstances.” [Emphasis added]. There it is, in writing.  Drunk driving warrants exceptions to the Constitution.  At least they have finally come out and said so.

While nobody argues that driving under the influence can be dangerous, it might help to put the 13,000 deaths a year in some context.  According to the latest data available from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, heart disease is our greatest killer, taking over 630,000 of us each year. (Deaths: Final Data for 2006, National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 57, no. 14, April 17, 2009).  That’s over 48 times more deaths than DUI.  Maybe the police should be able to stop you for a quick cholesterol and blood pressure check. It would save far more lives.  Cancer takes another 560,000 each year, and strokes another 137,000. Id.  DUI related deaths wouldn’t make it even in the top 15 causes of deaths.  Firearms accounted for over 30,000 deaths, which included 54.6% homicides and 41.4% suicides. Id.  In fact, there were 18,573 homicides in 2006, which is 30% more than the DUI related deaths. Id.  If an anonymous tip of a well described person carrying a gun at a bus stop is insufficient probable cause to justify a stop (see Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), given the prevalence of gun related violence just noted, then how can the court justify stopping drivers on similarly uncorroborated tips, just because alcohol might be involved. It is not illegal to drink and drive. It is illegal to drive when the driver is impaired by alcohol.  The police should have to have some evidence of impairment before they can stop a driver. In the balancing of freedom versus safety, Virginia made the right decision.

California’s Financial Responsibility Laws

If a person is convicted of a DUI, or suffers an administrative suspension subsequent to an Administrative Per Se Hearing before the California Department of Motor Vehicles, he/she will need to file proof of financial responsibility with the California Department of Motor Vehicles.  The proof of financial responsibility will need to remain on file with the California Department of Motor Vehicles typically for a period of three years, and a failure to do so will result in the immediate suspension of one’s driver’s license.  A suspension imposed out of the State of California for failure to maintain proof of financial responsibility can also result in a suspension of a person’s driver’s license in another state as well. 

When proof of financial responsibility is required, the person for whom it is required, must at all times carry, in the vehicle being driven, written evidence of one of the following types of financial responsibility:

• A valid liability insurance policy, for damage to someone else’s property or person (SR-22);
• A $35,000 surety bond;
• A DMV issued self-insurance certificate;
• An acknowledgement by the DMV of a $35,000 cash deposit

Said persons must show this written evidence to a peace officer upon request, and also to any other driver and/or property owner following a traffic accident.

Additionally, any person, whether subjected to the above requirements or not, must file DMV’s Traffic Accident Report Form (SR-1) within 10-days of any accident, if there is over $750.00 damage to anyone’s property, any injury, or death, regardless of whether or not you are at fault in the accident.

The SR-1 must be filed with the DMV.  An insurance agent/broker or other legal representative cannot file the report on another’s behalf.  Moreover, a traffic collision report and/or police report does not satisfy this legal requirement, but a person involved in an accident may include a copy of any such reports with the completed SR-1 filing.

A person who fails to file an SR-1 will have their driver’s license suspended until the SR-1 is filed.  The SR-1 Form is available at all DMV and California Highway Patrol (CHP) Offices throughout the State.  It is also available for download on the DMV’s website at: www.dmv.ca.gov.

California Penal Code § 836(a)(1) authorizes a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor where it is committed in the officer’s presence. “Presence” requires volitional movement of the vehicle perceived by the senses of the arresting officer. Mercer v. DMV (1991) 53 C3d 753.

CVC § 40030.5 further authorizes a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor drunk driving offense not committed in the officer’s presence, as follows:

In addition to the authority to make an arrest without a warrant pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of §836 of the Penal Code, a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person had been driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or any drug, or under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and any drug when any of the following exists:

• (a)  The person is involved in a traffic accident.
• (b)  The person is observed in or about a vehicle that is obstructing a roadway.
• (c)  The person will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested.
• (d)  The person may cause injury to himself or herself or damage property unless immediately arrested.
• (e)  The person may destroy or conceal evidence of the crime unless immediately arrested.

 The act of driving for purposes of the drunk driving statutes means “volitional movement” of the vehicle. Mercer v. DMV (1991) 53 C3d 753. In Mercer, the California Supreme Court contrasted the term “drive,” commonly understood to require “volitional movement” of the vehicle, with the term “driver” defined in CVC § 305 as one who is either driving or in actual physical control. The court pointed out that the phrase “actual physical control” does not appear anywhere in the drunk driving offense statutes. Further, the court noted that since “driver” is defined as one who drives or is in actual physical control, the two terms (“driver” versus “actual physical control”) must have different meanings. Construing these statutes strictly, rather than broadly, as is required by Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County (1970) 2 C3d 619, 631, the court held that mere actual physical control is not enough to constitute driving. Thus, “drive” for the purpose of the drunk driving statutes, requires actual “volitional movement” of the vehicle. The Mercer Court stated that: “Any doubt about our understanding of the word ‘drive’ is dispelled by decades of case law holding that the word ‘drive,’ when used in a drunk driving statute, requires evidence of a defendant’s volitional movement of a vehicle.” Id., at 410. 

Mercer further noted the following regarding the distinction between the terms “drive” and “operate” in Footnote 8 of its decision. Accord, Thomas v. State (1976) 277, Md. 314, 353 A2.d 256:

The term ‘driving’ is encompassed within the term ‘operating’; but the reverse is not necessarily so. One may not drive a vehicle without operating it; but one may operate the engine or devices of a vehicle without driving it. Otherwise stated: while all driving is necessarily operation of a motor vehicle, not all operation is necessarily driving. Id., 353 A.2d at p. 259, quoting McDuell v. State (Del.1976) 231 A.2d 265, 267.) See also, e.g., Williams v. State (1965) 111 Ga.App. 588, 142 S.E.2d 409, 411 (“[T]he offense of operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicants can be committed without driving it, but the offense of driving while under the influence can not be committed without operating the car.”; Jacobson v. State (Alaska 1976) 551 P.2d 935, 937; Gallagher v. Commonwealth (1964) 205 Va. 666, 139 S.E.2d 37, 39; Bradam v. State (1950) 191 Tenn. 626, 235 S.W.2d 801, 802-803. [Emphasis added.]

The Mercer decision has been overwhelmingly supported by its progeny. In Draeger v. Reed (App. 3 Dist. 1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1511, the court held that “for purposes of drunk driving statutes, the phrase, ‘to drive a vehicle’ is understood as requiring evidence of volitional movement of a vehicle.” Further, in People v. Lively, (App. 6 Dist. 1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1364, review denied, the court held that “‘driving,’ for purposes of misdemeanor ‘drunk driving’ means any volitional movement of a vehicle.”

With respect to the “driving” element of the crime of driving under the influence, even slight movement of the vehicle, so long as it is volitional, of course, constitutes direct evidence that the vehicle was being driven. People v. Garcia (Super. 1989) 214 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, Thus, while a police officer may not make a “lawful arrest” for “drunk driving” if the arrestee’s vehicle is lawfully parked and the officer has not observed the vehicle move pursuant to Mercer, an officer’s testimony that the arrestee’s vehicle rolled 15-to-20 feet in his presence was sufficient evidence that the arrestee drove the vehicle within the meaning of the drunk driving statutes pursuant to Garcia. Moreover, pursuant to People v. Wilson (Super. 1985) 176 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, there was sufficient evidence to show that the arrestee had been “driving,” and that he had been intoxicated at the time of driving, when he was seen sitting in the vehicle behind wheel with the engine running and the lights on when police found him approximately one-half mile from the nearest on-ramp from the freeway.  Thus, circumstantial evidence can be used to establish that a person was driving.

Also be aware that an anonymous and uncorroborated telephone tip about a potential drunk driver may be enough to trigger the “public safety” exception to the Fourth Amendment, even where the police do not independently observe anything unusual about the motorist or his driving prior to the enforcement stop. People v. Wells.  In Wells, the dispatcher broadcasted “a possibly intoxicated driver ‘weaving all over the roadway,’” and described the vehicle as an “80′s model blue van traveling northbound on Highway 99 at Airport Drive.” The officer, who was heading southbound 3 to 4 miles away from that location when he got the call, positioned himself on the shoulder of northbound Highway 99. “Two or three minutes” later he saw a blue van traveling approximately 50 miles per hour. He made an enforcement stop without independently observing any unusual, suspicious, or illegal driving.  Absolutely frightening.

It is because of these issues that you need a DUI Specialist to defend you in a driving under the influence (DUI) case. please contact the Law Office of Barry T. Simons by telephone at: 949-497-1729.  You may also send a confidential contact form via email to: info@simonslaw.com.  The form can be found on our website: www.duilawyerorangecounty.com.  The call could mean the difference between your being convicted of a DUI or being acquitted of it.

For information on California DUI Laws and representation for driving under the influence, please contact our website at: www.duilawyerorangecounty.com.